What we know about the Miami runway excursion of Amazon Air Flight 7598
The gist: A Boeing 767-300 cargo jet flying for Amazon Air overran a runway at Miami International Airport, tore through airport equipment, a cleaning crew's van and a passenger car, and came to rest about 1,300 feet past the pavement. The NTSB has recovered both recorders, which show the plane touching down fast, briefly spooling up toward go-around thrust, then settling back to idle and braking — with no sign that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed. Investigators say it is far too early to say why.
What's going on
The accident happened at 1:53 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time, involving Amazon Air Flight 7598, a Boeing 767-33 Alpha operated by 21 Air LLC of Miami, according to NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy [1]. The flight was arriving from San Juan, Puerto Rico with two crew members aboard, and it was the aircraft's third flight of the day: Cincinnati to Miami, Miami to San Juan, and back [2][3].
On landing, the aircraft overran runway 30, struck navigational aids and equipment, then hit a 2012 white Ford Econoline van owned by Professional Ocean Service Corporation, a contract cleaning company for the airlines, with seven people inside [3]. It then went through a perimeter fence and struck a Toyota Corolla Cross LE traveling on Northwest 67th Avenue, continued into the grass, and hit another fence line separating an area where Tesla robotaxis were stationed — about 1,300 feet past the paved surface in total [4][5]. Homendy described the scene as "devastating, utter devastation," with tire marks continuing from the pavement through the grass, the van "torn apart," and debris from vehicles, the aircraft and navigational aids spread across the area [6][7][8]. Asked whether the victims were limited to the two vehicles, the investigator in charge confirmed it was the Econoline van inside the airport and the small SUV outside [9].
Homendy said the aircraft was manufactured in 1994 [10]. She gave the takeoff weight as 252,182 pounds and the planned landing weight as 231,236 pounds, with 32,222 pounds of cargo — mainly contact lenses — and no hazardous materials aboard, confirmed by a hazmat team on site [11][12].
On crew experience, Homendy said the captain is 55, received his type rating in the 767 in May 2026, and has 7,145 hours according to his latest class I medical dated March 31, 2026; the first officer is 37, received his type rating on April 2, 2025, and has 2,655 hours according to a class one medical dated August 13, 2026 [13]. She said the NTSB would update those hours through interviews and compare them with company records [14].
Both recorders were recovered and sent to the NTSB lab in Washington: an L3 (rendered "Akron" in the transcript) FA2100 cockpit voice recorder with more than two hours of good quality audio, and an L3 SSFDR flight data recorder with about 55 hours of data across more than 400 parameters [14][15]. Investigator in charge Chihun Shin read out the final seconds of the flight data, with times given as seconds before the end of recording: at 30 seconds, the nose and right main landing gear touched down at a ground speed of 158 knots; at 23 seconds, brakes were applied at 146 knots; at 19 seconds, the left main gear touched down at 134 knots; at 15 seconds, brakes were released at 120 knots and throttles increased "to values consistent with go around thrust"[16]; at 11 seconds, throttles were reduced to idle, brakes reapplied, and ground speed was 117 knots; at seven seconds, accelerations changed at 96 knots; and the final recorded ground speed was 65 knots [17]. Shin stated there was "No indication in the recorded data that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed"[11].
Homendy declined to characterize those findings. Asked whether the lack of speed brake deployment was abnormal, she said that is analysis requiring an aircraft performance study, which the NTSB's research and engineering team is conducting [18][19]. Shin said the recorder data alone is not enough: "What we need to do is talk to the crew and get their account to understand how they're manipulating the controls in order to get a better understanding of the situation"[20]. Homendy added that crew interviews help fill in actions the crew "might have done, but not verbalized"[21].
On process, Homendy said the NTSB would not determine probable cause while on scene, and that the team of 32 was there to document perishable evidence and would remain about a week [5][22][23]. She said the agency does not release unverified information [24]. The operations team visited 21 Air's operations control center and interviewed the flight follower, a certified dispatcher; interviews with the assistant chief pilot and both pilots were scheduled for 9 a.m. the next day, with the chief pilot's interview still to be scheduled [25][26]. The NTSB said it would withhold the cockpit voice recorder readout until after interviewing the pilots, and planned an investigative update the following day [15][27][28].
Why it matters
The flight data tells a story that is unusual on its face, and the NTSB is deliberately not interpreting it yet. The aircraft touched down at 158 knots, briefly advanced the throttles toward go-around thrust, then pulled them back to idle and reapplied brakes [17][16]. Why a crew would initiate and then abandon a go-around, and why speed brakes and reversers do not appear in the data, are precisely the questions the performance study and crew interviews are meant to answer [19][20][21]. Homendy was explicit that she would not "speculate about what should have been"[18].
The accident also raises questions about what lies beyond the runway. Homendy said investigators will examine runway design, notices to airmen, fire and rescue response, and "the lack thereof of an engineered materials arresting system or EMAS"[29] — crushable material at a runway's end that safely stops aircraft, which she said FAA data puts at about 72 U.S. airports [30]. Asked whether EMAS would have prevented the tragedy and whether it should be everywhere, she called it "a key part of our investigation"[6]. The path of the jet also crossed a workplace: the van was carrying a contract cleaning crew, and Homendy said of the workers, "you would not think riding in a van to clean an airplane that this would happen"[31] [3].
Homendy placed the accident in a broader pattern, saying the NTSB has investigated "over 3,000" runway excursions since 2008, and that the agency's recommendations must be implemented or "we're going to be here again"[32] [33]. Asked whether such accidents are happening too often, she said: "One is too often for the NTSB. Just one"[34]. She also said the NTSB would examine the contractual relationship between Amazon and 21 Air — "who does what, what safety provisions might be in any sort of contracts"[35] — along with FAA oversight of all involved operators [36]. On reports of safety concerns regarding 21 Air, she said, "I don't know anything about those"[28].
The investigation carries its own human weight. Homendy noted that air traffic controllers are going through a difficult time and pointed them to NATCA's peer support team, and she described the airport as capacity constrained, with the NTSB working to release runways as documentation allows [37][38][25]. The agency's family assistance team is connecting families of the killed and injured with counseling, lodging, travel and food resources [39][40].
What's still unclear
Nearly everything about causation. The NTSB has not said why the aircraft overran the runway, whether speed, weather, aircraft systems or crew actions were factors, or what the cockpit voice recorder contains — the readout was deferred pending pilot interviews [15][27]. Homendy said there was no evidence yet on whether the pilots received weather information, only that it would be examined [41]. The NTSB also has not determined how far from the vehicles the recorded data points place the aircraft, saying that still has to be determined [42]. No air traffic transcript has been assembled, and the FAA is rechecking the list of controllers on duty because the quickly assembled "services rendered" teleconference information is often inaccurate [43][44][45].
The casualty count is not stated in either briefing. Homendy extended condolences to families who lost loved ones and to the injured, and the disaster assistance team's remit covers those killed and those seriously or minorly injured, but the briefings give no numbers [46][22]. Nor do they identify the crew's names or describe their condition; Homendy said the NTSB does not comment on individuals' health status [47]. The briefings also leave open what the aircraft's maintenance and systems history will show, what the engine and cockpit examinations will reveal, and what the promised preliminary report — due within a couple of weeks of the on-scene work — will conclude [48][49].
Written with AI (Memex) from 49 cited source passages. Every quotation was checked word-for-word against the sources: 12 of 12 verified.