NTSB Investigators on the Record: What the Recorders Showed, What Failed, What They Ruled Out, and What Comes Next

What this sheet covers

The NTSB's lead officials — Chair Jennifer Homendy, board member Todd Inman, and investigators in charge Chihun Shin, Doug Brazy and Ralph Hicks — describing what flight and cockpit recorders captured, which systems and procedures failed, what they ruled out, and what their teams will examine next, across the Miami 767 runway excursion, the Louisville MD-11 crash, the LaGuardia collision, the Philadelphia Learjet crash, the DCA midair and the Alaska 1282 door plug event.

Miami: the recorders and the landing sequence

"The flight data recorder contained approximately 55 hours of data and recorded more than 400 parameters."[1] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 6:50

Context: The chairwoman's summary of the FDR's contents on the second full day at Miami, before turning the podium to the investigator in charge for the event timeline.

"The cockpit voice recorder contained more than two hours of good quality audio"[2] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 6:09

Context: Describing the CVR recovered from the 767 and sent to the NTSB lab in Washington; she said the pilots would be interviewed before any readout was released.

"30 seconds before the end of the recording, the nose landing gear and the right main landing gear touched down and ground speed was 158 knots."[1] [3] — Chihun Shin, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 7:31

Context: The investigator in charge reading the FDR timeline, with all times referenced to the end of the recording.

"Throttles increased to values consistent with go around thrust."[3] [4] — Chihun Shin, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 8:12

Context: Part of the FDR sequence: 15 seconds before the end of recording, brakes were released at 120 knots and throttles advanced; 11 seconds before the end they were reduced to idle and brakes reapplied.

"No indication in the recorded data that speed brakes or thrust reversers were deployed."[5] — Chihun Shin, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 8:52

Context: The final ground speed in the data was 65 knots. Asked later whether that was abnormal, Shin declined to speculate pending an aircraft performance study.

"So the information I provided is only what's on the flight data recorder. What we need to do is talk to the crew and get their account to understand how they're manipulating the controls in order to get a better understanding of the situation."[6] — Chihun Shin, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 13:27

Context: Explaining why the NTSB would not release the CVR readout before interviewing the two pilots, scheduled for the next morning.

"With the cockpit voice recorder, while we have that data, crew accounts and crew interviews will help fill in some of the blanks for us that the crew remembers in terms of actions that they might have done, but not verbalized."[6] [7] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 14:09

Context: Answering why interviews matter even with recorder data in hand, specifically regarding the throttle movements.

Miami: the overrun, EMAS and what they ruled out

"Overran runway 30 on landing, struck navigational aids and equipment, then impacted a 2012 white Ford Econoline van that was owned by Professional Ocean Service Corporation which is a contract cleaning company for the airlines."[8] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 4:16

Context: The chairwoman's initial factual summary the night after the accident, describing the aircraft's path after the overrun.

"and they will look at the lack thereof of an engineered materials arresting system or EMAS"[9] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 10:23

Context: Listing the airport and survival factors group's tasks; she explained EMAS is crushable material at a runway end that safely stops an aircraft.

"what this is is crushable, lightweight material that's at the end of a runway that safely stops an aircraft."[10] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 11:04

Context: Defining EMAS for viewers after noting the airport and survival factors group would examine its absence at the runway end.

"The questions are on EMAS and whether that would have helped prevent this tragedy, and should the EMAS be everywhere at every airport? That will be a key part of our investigation."[11] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 14:35

Context: Responding to a reporter's question about EMAS; she called it a key part of the investigation rather than answering whether it would have helped.

"We do have information on speed. We do have data, but it's from various sources, and we want to confirm that data with a flight data recorder, so we're going to hold on that for now."[12] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 16:38

Context: Asked about landing speed and why the crew did not go around; she also said the NTSB wanted to interview the crew and crews of flights that landed before.

"That will be something that we look at. We look at that as part of any investigation, but we don't have evidence to that yet."[13] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 18:10

Context: Asked whether there was any indication the pilots did not receive weather or other information — a question she said the investigation would examine without current evidence.

"We have the manifest of the cargo and a hazmat team on site. They did confirm there was no hazmat on board."[14] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 9:35

Context: Giving weights and cargo details; the cargo was mainly contact lenses, and a hazmat team confirmed nothing hazardous aboard.

Miami: what comes next

"Tomorrow, they have interviews scheduled with the assistant chief pilot and both pilots of this aircraft."[15] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 4:46

Context: Outlining the next day's schedule; the operations team had already interviewed a 21 Air flight follower, a certified dispatcher.

"THE CAPTAIN IS 55 YEARS OLD, RECEIVED HIS TYPE RATING IN THE 7-6 IN MAY 2026."[15] [16] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 5:27

Context: Providing pilot experience data from medical records — the captain had 7,145 hours and the first officer, 37, had 2,655 hours — to be compared with company records after interviews.

"THE QUESTION IS WHAT TYPE OF PERISHABLE EVIDENCE DOES OUR TEAM STILL NEED TO FIND?"[17] [18] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 18:28

Context: Restating a reporter's question before answering that teams were still measuring runways 3-0 and 1-2, photographing debris found in the Tesla parking lot, and had retrieved the black box from the SUV.

"we're also trying to figure out who was on duty then."[19] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - Miami, FL Runway excursion accident involving a B-767-300 cargo airplane @ 15:46

Context: On the air traffic control side, she said the team lacked a full communications transcript and was working to confirm tower staffing because the FAA's quickly assembled services-rendered telecon information is often inaccurate.

Louisville: what the recorders showed

"we have viewed airport CCTV security coverage which shows the left engine detaching from the wing during the takeoff roll."[20] [21] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 1 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 2:49

Context: The board member's first-day account of video evidence, which he said helped investigators focus on where to look next.

"The cockpit voice recorder contained two hours and four minutes of what we consider good quality digital recorded audio."[22] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 3 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 2:46

Context: Reporting recorder contents on the third day; he said the crew completed standard checklists and the takeoff roll was uneventful through the speed call-outs.

"About 37 seconds after the crew called for takeoff thrust, a repeating bell was heard on the CVR, which persisted until the end of the recording 25 seconds later."[22] [23] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 3 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 3:27

Context: The key CVR finding; during those 25 seconds the crew worked to control the aircraft before the crash.

"During this time, the crew engaged in efforts to attempt to control the aircraft before the crash."[23] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 3 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 3:27

Context: Describing crew actions in the 25 seconds between the repeating bell and the end of the recording.

"The bulk of the left engine pylon was still attached to the left engine when the engine separated from the wing."[24] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 3 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 4:07

Context: A finding from examination of the recovered components, which he later said lets investigators move their focus into other areas.

"we know that that area needs to be an area of focus."[25] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 3 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 16:32

Context: On the left engine and pylon, given the video evidence; he clarified the pylon was attached when it disengaged from the aircraft, with later impact damage possible.

Louisville: what they ruled out and what they will examine

"To date, UPS has indicated to us that it was not delayed and that there was not maintenance work done immediately before."[26] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 1 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 17:19

Context: Addressing reports of a delay or pre-flight maintenance; he stressed the maintenance group would independently verify and that first glance did not point to immediate pre-takeoff work.

"We have not formed an ATC group. We have specialists in that, but at this point, it has not elevated itself to the point to where we feel they need an entire working group."[27] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 1 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 14:18

Context: Asked about staffing shortages during the government shutdown; he said SDF Tower appeared to be at proper complement and that air traffic control had not warranted a full group.

"right now we're not seeing something that says we need to open up an airport working group in regard to the closure of the runway"[28] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 1 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 18:51

Context: On how much the investigation would focus on the runway; he listed factors like FOD scans and pavement condition that would still be examined.

"we have no problem or concern if we find something that is of life safety or that is urgent of making an urgent recommendation to date we have not found anything that would indicate we need to take that action"[29] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 2 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 11:21

Context: On MD-11 checks and whether a fleet-wide concern existed; he said the NTSB would issue an urgent recommendation immediately if warranted.

"Obviously, we have a working theory right now, and we're trying to validate that against the FDR."[30] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 3 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 8:10

Context: Asked what the persistent cockpit bell meant; he cautioned it could be a mixture of several things and that FDR data would add granularity.

"we know that there was a fire occurring."[31] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 3 - UPS MD-11 Cargo Aircraft Crash, Louisville, KY @ 8:51

Context: Said alongside the working theory and the video evidence, while declining to speculate further until FDR examination.

LaGuardia: what the recorders showed

"The cockpit voice recorder contained more than 25 hours of good quality audio across four separate channels."[32] — Doug Brazy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 2:09

Context: The investigator in charge describing the recorders before summarizing the final three minutes of the CVR.

"The flight data recorder contained approximately 80 hours of data and recorded more than 400 parameters."[32] — Doug Brazy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 2:09

Context: Same briefing, on the FDR's contents; the chairwoman later said the download had not yet been reviewed.

"At 54 seconds, the flight crew acknowledged that the airplane was 500 feet above the ground and on a stable"[33] — Doug Brazy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 4:13

Context: Part of the CVR timeline; earlier, at one minute three seconds, an airport vehicle's radio transmission was stepped on by another transmission from an unidentified source.

"At 20 seconds, the tower cleared truck one and company to cross runway four at taxiway Delta."[34] — Doug Brazy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 4:54

Context: The clearance at the center of the timeline; at nine seconds the tower instructed truck one to stop, and at eight seconds came a sound consistent with the airplane's landing gear touching down.

"At six seconds, there was a pilot transfer of controls from one pilot to the other."[35] — Doug Brazy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 6:17

Context: The last events on the recording; the chairwoman clarified the first officer was flying and transferred control to the captain.

LaGuardia: what failed and what they ruled out

"Their analysis shows that the ASDX system did not alert."[36] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 11:53

Context: Reporting the FAA tech center's analysis of the surface surveillance system; she then quoted the analysis's explanation.

"ASDX did not generate an alert due to the close proximity of vehicles merging and unmerging near the runway, resulting in the inability to create a track of high confidence."[36] [37] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 12:34

Context: The chairwoman quoting the FAA tech center's analysis verbatim, and repeating it, on why the system stayed silent.

"Truck one, however, did not have a transponder."[38] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 7:41

Context: On the firefighting vehicle that collided with the aircraft; she later said there was no indication any of the trucks had transponders.

"Again, I do not know. We do have no indication that was a factor here, but it is a shift that we have been focused on in past investigations."[39] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 11:13

Context: On the midnight shift and fatigue; she noted two controllers in the cab is standard procedure at LaGuardia for that shift and common practice nationally.

"I would caution pointing fingers at controllers and saying distraction was involved."[40] [41] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 13:14

Context: Responding to press reports of controller distraction; she described a heavy workload environment with a United flight and unresolved questions about shift change.

"We don't know that yet. We need to do interviews of those two firefighters."[42] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 25:24

Context: Asked whether the two firefighters in the vehicle heard the directive to stop; she said the CCTV had to be paired with interviews.

LaGuardia: what comes next

"We have to look at records, there's sign-in sheets, we have to do interviews, we have to look at time cards"[43] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 1: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 12:15

Context: Explaining how the NTSB verifies tower staffing and controller positions before releasing information.

"We may have information that comes our way that we didn't expect, so we don't rule anything out until later."[44] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 1: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 11:16

Context: On the questions remaining, particularly about air traffic control; she said the investigation does not limit itself at this stage.

"we rarely, if ever, investigate a major accident where it was one failure."[45] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing 2: Air Canada CRJ900 & Jazz Aviation Collision at LaGuardia Airport @ 14:37

Context: Her closing point before questions: the aviation system's multiple layers of defense mean many things go wrong when an accident occurs.

Philadelphia: the missing recorder and the silence

"We have located the two engines, but for the cockpit voice recorder, we are still looking for it."[46] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Learjet Crash in Philadelphia, PA @ 8:04

Context: The day after the Learjet 55 crash; she said the recorder could be intact but likely damaged or fragmented, and asked the public to email witness@ntsb.gov with debris.

"The entire flight lasted less than a minute."[47] — Ralph Hicks, NTSB Media Briefing - Learjet Crash in Philadelphia, PA @ 6:43

Context: The investigator in charge describing GPS data: a climb to about 1,500 feet, a slight right turn, a slight left turn, then a steep descent.

"Nothing was communicated." [48] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Learjet Crash in Philadelphia, PA @ 16:28

Context: Asked whether anything was communicated from the flight deck to air traffic control; she added that controllers tried to get a response from the crew and received none.

"Certainly it's critical so we can hear what's happening in the cockpit. However, it doesn't mean that we can't continue our investigation and complete it, we can."[49] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Briefing - Learjet Crash in Philadelphia, PA @ 15:47

Context: On how crucial the still-missing cockpit voice recorder is; she called it one piece of the investigation that adds information.

DCA midair: what they ruled out

"We do not know enough facts to be able to rule in or out human factor, mechanical factors."[50] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 1 - Bombardier CRJ700 & Sikorsky UH-60L military helicopter collision @ 13:05

Context: Asked about the Defense Secretary's statement that a mistake was made; the board member said the group process would determine causes.

"we have not recovered the flight data recorders yet. We know they're there. They are underwater."[51] — a speaker in NTSB Media Briefing 1 - Bombardier CRJ700 & Sikorsky UH-60L military helicopter collision @ 12:24

Context: On the recorders in the Potomac recovery; the speaker noted the NTSB has often recovered recorders from water and its lab is about a mile away.

"Nothing we've seen would indicate that maybe slides or shoots were deployed."[52] — Todd Inman, NTSB Media Briefing 1 - Bombardier CRJ700 & Sikorsky UH-60L military helicopter collision @ 21:12

Context: On the debris fields; he described a very quick, rapid impact while stressing the information still needed verification.

Alaska 1282: what broke and what was ruled out

"The exam to date has shown that the door in fact did translate upward. All 12 stops became disengaged, allowing it to blow out of the fuselage."[53] — a speaker in NTSB Media Brief - Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 (Jan 8) livestream @ 17:23

Context: The structures specialist's account of the door plug examination; both guide tracks on the plug were fractured and the four stop bolts had not been recovered.

"We have not yet recovered the four bolts that restrain it from its vertical movement. and we have not yet determined if they existed there."[53] — a speaker in NTSB Media Brief - Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 (Jan 8) livestream @ 17:23

Context: The open question at the center of the investigation, to be resolved by laboratory examination of the plug in Washington.

"At this time, we have no indications whatsoever that this correlated in any way to the expulsion of the door plug and the rapid decompression."[54] — Jennifer Homendy, NTSB Media Brief - Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 (Jan 8) livestream @ 9:49

Context: On the cabin pressure control system and the auto pressurization light; she said the triple redundant system operated as designed on prior flights and would still be examined.

"Deicing is a procedure that is done routinely during the winter periods, and there are no indications that is contributory in any way to this event."[55] — a speaker in NTSB Media Brief - Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 (Jan 8) livestream @ 30:28

Context: Responding to a reporter's elaborate de-icing scenario, which the speaker said had no evidence to support it at all.

"they described a very loud environment, chaotic."[55] [56] — a speaker in NTSB Media Brief - Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 (Jan 8) livestream @ 31:11

Context: From interviews with the captain and first officer, who heard a bang and pressure changes in their ears; a laminated checklist flew out the open door.

Best lines

Written with AI (Memex) from 56 cited source passages. Every quotation was checked word-for-word against the sources: 60 of 60 verified.